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cybersecurity, its importance to computational 
science, and the resources to achieve and maintain 
an appropriate cybersecurity program.
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 Audience Participation
3
● Encourage questions, comments, and 
interaction during the presentation, esp.
○ personal/project-specific stories, both 
positive and not-so-positive
○ experience with tools
● Welcome constructive feedback
 Challenges for this presentation
4
● Not knowing audience in advance
● Right level of  detail:
○ “developers need to be aware of secure 
coding techniques and tools” (too high)
vs.
○ “if you’re writing a web application using 
javascript, you need to …” (too low)
 Audience?
5
Not mutually exclusive, obviously.
● software developers?
● scientists?
● students?
● managers?
● system admins?
● analysts?
 Background and Motivation
6
 NSF “CI Framework for 21st century” (CIF21)
7
Software is fundamentally computer code. It can be 
delivered to end users in multiple formats, ranging from an 
archive that a user downloads and builds to an executable 
or a service running on a remote system to which a user 
connects. Especially at large scale, software is generally 
difficult to design, implement and then maintain, and the 
software needed by the science, engineering, and 
education communities is particularly complex. Software 
must be reliable, robust, and secure; able to produce 
trustable and reproducible scientific results; …
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12113/nsf12113.pdf 
 Software and the NSF
8
● Software (including services) essential for
the bulk of science
○ About half the papers in recent issues of Science were software-intensive projects
○ Research becoming dependent upon advances in software
○ Significant software development being conducted across NSF: NEON, OOI, NEES, NCN, iPlant, etc
○ Wide range of software types: system, applications, modeling, gateways, analysis, algorithms, 
middleware, libraries
● Software is not a one-time effort, it must be sustained
○ Development, production, and maintenance are people intensive
○ Software life-times are long vs hardware
○ Software has under-appreciated value
http://www.slideshare.net/danielskatz/metrics-citation-for-software-and-data
CyVerse
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“It’s clear that open and reproducible science and 
engineering will need an integrated approach to 
code and data management, as both are complex 
and evolving.”
LeVeque, Randall J., Ian M. Mitchell, and Victoria 
Stodden. 2012. “Reproducible Research for Scientific 
Computing: Tools and Strategies for Changing the 
Culture.” Computing in Science and Engineering 14 
(4).
 Further reading
● Howison, J., E. Deelman, M. J. McLennan, R. Ferreira da Silva, and J. D. Herbsleb. 
2015. “Understanding the Scientific Software Ecosystem and Its Impact: Current 
and Future Measures.” Research Evaluation, July. doi:10.1093/reseval/rvv014
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 Secure Software Engineering
11
 Secure SE vs. SE
12
How is Secure Software Engineering different from 
Software Engineering?
From CIF21, why not also have: 
{Reliable, Robust, Secure, Trustable, Reproducible} SE?
 Secure SE vs. SE
13
How is Secure Software Engineering different from 
Software Engineering?
From CIF21, why not also have: 
{Reliable, Robust, Secure, Trustable, Reproducible} SE ?
→ SE should be comprehensive.
 Introduction
14
Software engineering (SE) is concerned with 
developing and maintaining software systems 
that behave reliably and efficiently, are 
affordable to develop and maintain, and satisfy 
all the requirements that customers have defined 
for them.
http://computingcareers.acm.org/?page_id=12 
 Introduction
15
Software engineering (SE) is concerned with 
developing and maintaining software systems 
that behave reliably and efficiently, are 
affordable to develop and maintain, and satisfy 
all the requirements that customers have defined 
for them. →  security
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Software engineering (SE) is about
problem modeling and analysis, software design, 
software verification and validation, software quality, 
software process, software management, etc.
http://computingcareers.acm.org/?page_id=12 
 Motivation
17
Why do we care about secure software?
● prevent loss of data
● prevent premature leaks of data
● prevent downtime of resources
   (CIA: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability)
→ better science, better public trust
 SE is language agnostic; but tools may not be
18
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/the-2016-top-programming-languages
http://spectrum.ieee.org/ns/IEEE_TPL_2016/methods.html  (12 metrics; 10 sources)
Cf. http://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/ 
 
 Community Engineering
19
 Community Engineering - definition
20
Community Engineering is the continuing process of 
establishing expectations and social environment that 
support, rather than hinder, effective, adaptive, and 
ethical engineering practice within a team or 
community.
 21
No one develops software in a vacuum.  Our tools, 
our expectations, our relationships with teammates 
and upstream developers, and the overall 
environments in which we operate have huge 
cumulative impact on our behavior and the quality of 
our work.
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You can’t change people…
...but you can change their environment.
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Community Engineering Overview
● Split agency is NEVER acceptable.
● Make the right thing as easy to do as possible.
● Communication should be cheap, frequent, and 
clear.
● Look at your incentives and disincentives like a 
gamer: if you minmax hard, what do you get?
● No environment makes every human happy.  Think 
hard about who you want to attract and keep, and 
what is a good culture for those people.
 Split Agency
“Split agency” is the condition where the person who 
controls how something is done and with what 
resources is not the person who is responsible for the 
outcome.
Split agency kills morale, creates perverse incentives, 
and lowers quality of work.
Example: Project lead budgets zero developer time for 
documentation, then holds developers responsible for 
lack of documentation.24
 Make doing the right thing easier.
In an ideal world, developers do the right thing no 
matter what stands in their way.
In the real world, where we have schedules and limited 
skill sets and interpersonal conflicts, most developers 
will do as good a thing as seems plausible.
This means that, with better tools and processes, you 
can get better work out of most people...
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 Make doing the right thing easier. (cont.)
Generally, look ways to automate away repetitive or 
time-consuming tasks, and reduce developer friction.  
Examples:
● Set up a pre-receive hook to reject commits that fail 
tests or don’t meet style standards so developers fix 
small problems on code that’s fresh in their minds, 
not big ones on code they have to re-analyze.
● Migrate away from outdated tools like CVS and 
SVN… the time invested learning and moving to git 
or hg is quickly paid back in saved effort/frustration.
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 Communication should be...
Cheap: developers should be focused on development; 
communication should be fast, easy, and not take 
much time and attention.
Frequent: a quick question or clarification early will 
save a lot of time over only addressing things when 
they’ve become problems.
Clear: precise, concrete communication will get you 
furthest with most engineers and cause the least stress
27
 What does your project incentivize?
“minmaxing” is a gamer term that means to carefully 
optimize a set of variables for optimal game 
performance.  Most good programmers are at least 
decent game theorists...which means that it is VERY 
easy to destroy a team with perverse incentives.
Example: If you measure developer performance by 
lines of code produced, you will get bloated code that 
no one wants to refactor and little to no 
documentation.
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 What does your project disincentivize?
If the boss gets angry when coders are standing around 
talking instead of coding, collaboration plummets.
If the continuous integration tool breaks on 30% of 
commits, and has to be manually cleaned up, 
programmers will abandon “commit early, commit 
often” in favor of fewer, bigger, hard-to-review 
commits.
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 Creating culture...
There are many “good” development team cultures, for 
varying definitions of “good”.  Optimal culture for a 
team that quietly and competently maintains 
important infrastructure is likely to be different than 
for a team that’s trying to bring an edgy and still 
somewhat undefined product to market, which is in 
turn different from a team that only does incident 
response.
What your team does should define its culture, to 
attract and keep the most qualified people possible.
30
 Secure SwEng BP: Goal
31
Help software developers 
and operators deliver and 
maintain secure software 
over its entire lifecycle.
 SwEng Processes/Lifecycle
32
1) Requirements
2) Design
3) Implement
4) Test
5) Maintain
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SDLC_-_Software_Development_Life_Cycle.jpg 
 vuln mgt
SwEng Lifecycle + Security
33
logging
secure 
coding
static 
analysis
dynamic 
analysis
code 
signing
Be security conscious during each phase.
 Evolution of SwEng Models
34
● Waterfall
● Incremental
● Extreme
● Spiral
● Agile
● CI/CD
Reqs
Design
Code
Test
Maintain
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● Waterfall
● Incremental
● Extreme
● Spiral
● Agile
● CI/CD
Individuals and interactions over 
processes and tools
Working software over 
comprehensive documentation
Customer collaboration over 
contract negotiation
Responding to change over 
following a plan
http://agilemanifesto.org/ (2001) 
 Traditional vs. Agile
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MS.2009.145
36
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https://sciencenode.org/feature/xsede-community-builds-an-agile-student.php
https://www.xsede.org/ 
● Collaboration
● Spiral development
● Pair-programming
● Rapid release
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● Waterfall
● Incremental
● Extreme
● Spiral
● Agile
● CI/CD
Continuous Integration /
Continuous Delivery:
● prioritize deployable s/w (at 
any moment) vs. working 
on new features
● incremental s/w change → 
automated test & feedback
 SwEng Models
39
Extreme ~ Incremental ~ Agile ~ CI/CD
→  DevOps
The idea of doing/automating frequent 
builds and tests, after incremental 
changes, and making it operational. 
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  security at each phase
   Saltzer & Schroeder (1975):
1. Economy of Mechanism 
(simple & small)
2. Separation of Privilege:   
(2+ pieces of info for access)
3. Least Privilege
(each process has min priv)
…
8.   Psychological Acceptability        
      (easy to use)
 Further reading
● Dyba, T., and T. Dingsoyr. 2009. “What Do We Know about 
Agile Software Development?” IEEE Software. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MS.2009.145 
● http://martinfowler.com/bliki/ContinuousDelivery.html 
● https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/devops/2014/03/an-introductio
n-to-devops.html
● https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/process-agnostic-navigati
onal-view 
● Best Practices in Scientific Computing, G.Wilson, 2014:
http://swcarpentry.github.io/slideshows/best-practices
● Saltzer, J. H. & Schroeder, M. D. "The Protection of 
Information in Computer Systems," Proc of the IEEE 63, 9 
(1975).
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 Software-related Thrusts at CTSC
42
 Software Security
43
Secure Software Engineering
Software 
Assurance
Situational
Awareness
CTSC has a 
thrust in each 
of these.
 Software Assurance (SwA)
#1) SwA is the level of confidence that software is free from 
vulnerabilities, either intentionally designed into the software or 
accidentally inserted at any time during its life cycle, and that 
the software functions in the intended manner.
#2) The processes (e.g., secure coding, static analysis) that help 
improve this level of confidence.
 → secure coding instruction (http://trustedci.org/trainingmaterials) 
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https://samate.nist.gov/Main_Page.html
 Situational Awareness
Being aware of software vulnerabilities and how they might 
affect a user community. Offering advice on how to patch or 
update vulnerable software.
http://trustedci.org/situational-awareness
http://blog.trustedci.org/2016/08/situational-awar
eness.html 
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 Situational Awareness: example
perfSONAR provides tools and architecture to help monitor 
network performance.
...released updated packages on July 7th to address two 
security issues:
1. An unauthenticated remote access vulnerability that could 
allow an attacker to view local files as the 'perfsonar' user.
2. A local privilege escalation issue.
(instructions for updating software follow)
46
https://list.indiana.edu/sympa/arc/ctsc-announce-inf-l/2016-07/msg00000.html 
 Secure SwEng BP: Approach
47
● Instill security awareness in 
software engineers - 
developers and testers.
● Educate them in appropriate 
processes, practices, and tools.
 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
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 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
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 Repositories
What’s in a repository?  Everything (we hope).
       e.g. https://github.com/TAlexPerkins/Zika_nmicrobiol_2016 
Modern SCMs offer more than just the history of a 
code base:
● integrity checking
● automation of common tasks
● cheaper branching and merging, which encourages 
better development practices
● the ability to work in a decentralized manner
50
 Source code repositories and version control
● CVCS:   RCS, CVS, SVN  
○ Outmoded, should be migrated away from
● DVCS:  Git, Mercurial
○ More modern, but each has trade-offs.
○ If unsure, default to git.
● Each of these systems, especially git and Mercurial, 
can also function as a part of a bigger continuous 
integration system.
51
 Repositories and Hosting Services
Regardless of the repo/hosting service you choose, 
be mindful of security considerations: 
● physical security
● server logging
● encrypted access
● granularity of access control
● 2FA
● do not commit sensitive data to public repos
○ keep in mind that a currently-private repo may need 
to be shared more widely later: keep credentials 
separate from code, or you’ll be sanitizing history.
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 Further reading
● https://help.github.com/articles/github-security/ 
● http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/06/dev_blunder_
shows_github_crawling_with_keyslurping_bots/   
53
 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
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 Software Testing 
● why is it necessary?
● why is it difficult?
● how well does it work?
● can it be made easier?
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 Software Testing 
● why is it necessary?
○ test for “correctness”
○ help prevent bugs/vulnerabilities
○ improve usability
● why is it difficult?
● how well does it work?
● can it be made easier?
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 Software Testing 
● why is it necessary?
● why is it difficult?
○ time-consuming
○ combinatorial challenge
● how well does it work?
● can it be made easier?
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 Software Testing 
● why is it necessary?
● why is it difficult?
● how well does it work?
○ as well as your tests
● can it be made easier?
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 Software Testing 
● why is it necessary?
● why is it difficult?
● how well does it work?
● can it be made easier?   yes:
○ testing frameworks
○ automated testing (e.g. via CI)
59
 Types of Testing 
60
● Static
○ code not executing
○ code walkthroughs
● Dynamic
○ code is executing 
○ written by software 
dev/test engineer
● Black-box
○ don’t know source code
● White-box
○ know source code
 Levels of Dynamic Testing 
61
● Unit (small)
○ test single functions
○ written by software dev
● Integration (medium)
○ test interacting functions/packages
○ written by software dev/test engineer
● Acceptance (large)
○ overall testing
○ written by test engineer
 More Dynamic Testing 
62
● Regression
○ as software is modified, make sure no new 
(or old) bugs have been introduced
● Combinatorial
○ all combinations of input parameters
● Fuzz
○ with random/noisy inputs
● Security
○ for Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
(CIA)
 DARPA Grand Challenge 2016
63
https://www.cybergrandchallenge.com/ 
https://github.com/CyberGrandChallenge/ 
Find (and fix) vulnerabilities in binary codes.
Fuzzing was a favorite technique.
 Testing:  think globally, act locally
Acting locally:  
Use Assertions in code!
“primary purpose is to instrument code with test probes that will 
detect errors as close as possible to their place of occurrence.”  
Tony Hoare, 2002
64
“... the programmer should make assertions about 
the various states that the machine can reach.”    
Alan Turing, 1949
 Assertions
Assertions are always expected to be True:
assert(condition) 
If they are false at runtime, they will throw an error.
(They can be disabled if desired).
C/C++:
assert(ptr);
Java:
Assert.assertTrue((project1.getCreationTime() - 
  project2.getCreationTime()) > 0);
65
 Testing:  theory
www.di.ens.fr/~cousot/AI/IntroAbsInt.html 
66
“It is not possible to write a program able to represent and to compute all 
possible executions of any program in all its possible execution 
environments.”
t=time
x(t) = vector of (input,state,output)
 Testing Frameworks
● Primarily for Unit Testing
● xUnit: for Unit testing
○ JUnit (Java), PyUnit (Python), etc. 
wikipedia: List_of_unit_testing_frameworks 
- lots of languages, lots of frameworks
67
 Automated Testing 
68
www.owasp.org/index.php/Appendix_A:_Testing_Tools
e.g.:
● github.com/google/googletest 
○ Google’s (open source) C++ testing framework
● http://docs.seleniumhq.org/ 
○ OSS for testing web applications
 Automated Testing 
69
https://golang.org/pkg/testing/
testing   Package testing provides support for automated testing of Go pkgs.
iotest implements Readers and Writers useful mainly for testing.
quick implements utility functions to help with black box testing.
Some languages are better equipped for testing than others.
This may be useful for the next generation of software 
projects, but may not help us today.
Thoughts?
 Testing Suites
The Software Assurance Reference Dataset (SARD) 
provide users, researchers, and software security 
assurance tool developers with a set of known security 
flaws.
http://samate.nist.gov/index.php/SARD.html 
https://samate.nist.gov/SARD/testsuite.php?login=Guest 
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 Further reading
● Kanewala, U. and J. M. Bieman. 2014. “Testing Scientific Software: A 
Systematic Literature Review.” Information and Software Technology 56 (10): 
1219–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infsof.2014.05.006
● Introducing Combinatorial Testing in a Large Organization:  Experience 
Report,  J. Hagar. D.R. Kuhn, R.N. Kacker, T. Wissink. IEEE Computer, April 
2015.
● http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/documents/kuhn-kacker-lei-hunter09.
pdf  
● https://www.wired.com/2016/06/hacker-lexicon-fuzzing/ 
● Hoare, T. 2002. “Assertions in Modern Software Engineering Practice.” In 
Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2002. COMPSAC 2002. 
Proceedings. 26th Annual International, 459–459.
● http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=462&title=01a 
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 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
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 $ make hello
c++ -std=c++11    hello.cpp   -o hello
hello.cpp:15:7: warning: using the result of an assignment as a 
condition without parentheses [-Wparentheses]
        if (a=b) {
...
hello.cpp:15:7: note: use '==' to turn this assignment into an 
equality comparison
73
 Static Analysis
Static analysis tools try to find bugs/vulnerabilities in 
source code. Bugs are then categorized by severity.
Q: why doesn’t every software developer use static 
analysis tools?
Do you/your team?
74
 Static Analysis
Static analysis tools try to find bugs/vulnerabilities in 
source code. Bugs are then categorized by severity.
Q: why doesn’t every software developer use static 
analysis tools?
A (typically): hassle (time, learning curve), 
false positives, doesn’t catch complex vulnerabilities, ...
75
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis
 Coverity Scan (free for OSS)
Defect density is measured by the number 
of defects  per 1,000 lines of code
76
e.g.,
 SonarQube (https://sonarqube.com/)
77
● OSS
● Used by many 
projects
● Can be integrated 
with Eclipse IDE
 78
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 Static Analysis Plugins: 
e.g. IntelliJ IDEA + FindBugs
80
(We will re-visit static analysis plugins for IDEs in 
the Tools section)
 Static analysis as a service: SWAMP
SWAMP - SoftWare Assurance MarketPlace
https://continuousassurance.org/ 
81
 Example: Upload, Build, Analyze
82
 Example: Upload, Build, Analyze
83
Describe 
build 
process
 Example: Upload, Build, Analyze
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 Example: Upload, Build, Analyze
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 Examples of potential vulnerabilities
•CWE-398: Indicator of Poor Code Quality
•CWE-547: Use of Hard-coded, Security-relevant Constants
•CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value
•CWE-571: Expression is Always True
•CWE-581: Object Model Violation: Just One of Equals and Hashcode Defined
•CWE-584: Return Inside Finally Block
•CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use ('Unused Variable')
•CWE-478: Missing Default Case in Switch Statement
•CWE-495: Private Array-Typed Field Returned From A Public Method
86
cwe.mitre.org   - Common Weakness Enumeration:  
      a dictionary of software weakness types.
 For more in-depth details, see “secure coding” related 
slides at: 
http://trustedci.org/trainingmaterials/ 
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 Further reading
● Johnson, B., Y. Song, E. Murphy-Hill, and R. Bowdidge. 2013. “Why Don’t 
Software Developers Use Static Analysis Tools to Find Bugs?” In Proceedings 
of the 2013 International Conference on Software Engineering, 672–81. ICSE 
’13. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press.
● Kupsch, J. A., E. Heymann, B. Miller, and V. Basupalli. 2016. “Bad and Good 
News about Using Software Assurance Tools.” Software: Practice & 
Experience, doi:10.1002/spe.2401 . 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/spe.2401/full 
● http://trustedci.org/trainingmaterials/
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 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
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 Vulnerability Management
Phases of vulnerability management (after one has 
been found):
● Notifying* appropriate people
● Fixing/Patching
● Testing
● Communicating* fix
patch: a software update that can be applied to an existing 
code base in order to eliminate one or more vulnerabilities.
90
*  responsibly, hopefully
 Vulnerability Management
91
Wouldn’t it be great if it was this simple?
 Vulnerability Management
92
It can be complicated:
● software dependencies
● complex configuration
● mission-critical uptime
● difficult to reach resources
● what else?
 Further reading
93
● http://blog.trustedci.org/search/label/vulnerabilities
● https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/applicat
ion/building-application-vulnerability-management-progra
m-35297
● http://www.pcworld.com/article/2059580/opensource-sof
tware-projects-need-to-improve-vulnerability-handling-pra
ctices-researchers-say.html
● https://www.apache.org/security/committers.html 
● https://blog.jupyter.org/2016/08/03/security-fix-notebook
-4-2-2/ 
● https://www.debian.org/doc/manuals/securing-debian-ho
wto/ch7.en.html 
 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
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 Release & Delivery
How can one help ensure the authenticity 
and integrity of software (and data)?
● cryptographic checksums, hashes
● SHA-{1,2,3} (Secure Hash Alg) …
● digital signatures (e.g., GPG)
1) Download a file 
2) Compute a hash on it
3) Compare to published hash
95
 Simple example
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
  printf("hello, world\n");
}
$ md5 hello.c
MD5 (hello.c) = 86d1a675a06b1ea6e7ddc90e79153cdf
----------------  edit hello.c and add another blank space before ‘world’
$ md5 hello.c
MD5 (hello.c) = 3a0e40763afa9337c5275c4e70a86943
$ shasum -a 256 hello.c 
f5f3cff1beb5cfb9b9be6702c0da3964c996b78c4e1db286a96712a8bd37ef47  hello.c
96
 Example: MD5
pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso            03-Mar-2016 15:15    225M
pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso.md5   03-Mar-2016 15:15    81
Verify validity:
 
$ more pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso.md5
bfa2972732fe2a04abea1de368cdae61  
pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso
$ md5 pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso
MD5 (pS-Toolkit-3.5.1-NetInstall-i386-2016Mar03.iso) = 
bfa2972732fe2a04abea1de368cdae61
R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm , RFC Editor, 1992 
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You will likely encounter codes with MD5 hashes. 
But, do NOT use MD5 for your own code/data.
 SHA-Secure Hash Alg.
http://toolkit.globus.org/.../globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg.sha1
39e9fb34c8dd3f9025ffbe21392e9b071ac57c36 
http://toolkit.globus.org/.../globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg.sha512
4bea23ea575cd1924b0843699c5bb74ff137410d8bb5bd1f01b3c46530981bc97d2b162
716bd0dfdb373e95e63af05d199e31dacebd1013620d0dfb11c2d2719
-------- verify after downloading:
$ shasum globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg     # defaults to SHA1
39e9fb34c8dd3f9025ffbe21392e9b071ac57c36
$ shasum -a 512 globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg 
4bea23ea575cd1924b0843699c5bb74ff137410d8bb5bd1f01b3c46530981bc97d2b162
716bd0dfdb373e95e63af05d199e31dacebd1013620d0dfb11c2d2719
98
 ~10M in size       
SHA-n:   how long to compute?
$ time shasum -a 1 globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg
39e9fb34c8dd3f9025ffbe21392e9b071ac57c36  globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg
real 0m0.073s
user 0m0.059s
sys 0m0.010s
$ time shasum -a 512 globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg
4bea23ea575cd1924b0843699c5bb74ff137410d8bb5bd1f01b3c46530981bc97d2b162
716bd0dfdb373e95e63af05d199e31dacebd1013620d0dfb11c2d2719  
globus_toolkit-6.0.1453307864.pkg
real 0m0.100s
user 0m0.085s
sys 0m0.011s
99
 Digital signatures: e.g. GPG
A digital signature certifies and timestamps a 
document. If the document is subsequently modified in 
any way, a verification of the signature will fail. 
“signature” via private key.
GPG (Gnu Privacy Guard):
Free implementation of the OpenPGP standard (www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt)
100
 Further reading
101
● https://www.apache.org/dev/release-signing (PGP 
signatures)
● https://www.gnupg.org/faq/gnupg-faq.html
● http://oss-watch.ac.uk/resources/releasemanagementbestpr
actice (PGP signatures, hashes)
● http://blog.sonatype.com/2010/01/how-to-generate-pgp-sig
natures-with-maven/ (Maven central repo requires PGP 
signatures)
● https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/keccak_is
_sha-3.html 
● https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Tools-Signing-Your-Wor
k 
 Secure SwEng BP Topics
● Repositories
● Testing
● Static Analysis
● Vulnerability Management
● Release & Delivery
● Coding/Project Tools
● Documentation
102
 Choosing Tools and Libraries in an Imperfect 
World
103
 Confidence vs. Migration Cost
104
Confidence
M
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 Qualities that inspire confidence
in tools and libraries:
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● Resources appropriate to the scope and complexity 
of the project.
● Adoption/dependance by players capable of 
resourcing the project if it is in trouble.
● License that facilitates forking should the project be 
mishandled by or lose the interest of current 
maintainers.
● Maturity of software development practices 
(behaviors we’re teaching in this training).
● Quality of architecture and maintainability of code.
 Qualities that reduce migration cost
from tools and libraries:
● Ability to get copies of data (if you aren’t already 
self-hosting).
● Open, standard data formats (where applicable).
● Use of standard protocols and interfaces.
● Tool/library criticality to your projects (trivial use is 
trivial to give up)
106
 Coding/Project Tools
Tools for writing/modifying/maintaining/managing 
code and overall software project.
How do coding/project tools help improve software 
security?
● convenience of integrated functionality: 
○ code navigation, repo access, debugging, etc.
● community reviewing
● integrated static analysis
● issue tracking: prioritize, assign responsibility
107
 Project and Issue Tracking tools
e.g. JIRA (https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira)
108
Courtesy of Apache 
Airavata project.
 Issue Tracking & Vuln Patching
For a public project with issue tracking, there needs to 
be a mechanism to keep certain issues private, e.g., 
vulnerability patches until they are ready for release.
Experiences?
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 Continuous Integration
110
Continuous Integration (CI), which some people think is 
a relatively new concept, is actually not so new:
Grady Booch, Object-Oriented Analysis and Design with Applications, 2nd Ed, 1993.
“Individual developers can create their own stable release into 
which they integrate new versions of the software for which 
they are responsible, before releasing it to the rest of the team. 
In this manner, we have a platform for continuous integration of 
new code.”
 CI in the Cloud
111
Continuous Integration as a cloud service is newer.
 Some popular CI tools include:
● Travis - travis-ci.org (limited to github)
● Bamboo - www.atlassian.com/software/bamboo 
● Jenkins - jenkins.io
Meyer, M. 2014. “Continuous Integration and Its Tools.” 
IEEE Software 31 (3): 14–16.
 Travis CI (Linux & OSX)
● a hosted CI service
● integrates with GitHub
● free for open source projects
● “easy to use”
112
Basic idea:
● Allow Travis CI to access your github repo
● Create a .yml file to describe your build
 https://docs.travis-ci.com/user/customizing-the-build/ 
● A “push” will auto-generate a build 
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 AppVeyor (Windows)
● free for open source projects
● www.appveyor.com
● software as a service
114
 Continuous Integration: Pegasus WMS
Each commit:
● triggers a build of the current dev branch. This results in 
documentation and rpm, deb and binary packages.
● triggers units tests of the various components.
Nightly: end to end workflow tests (workflows are for the last 
major release branch and the current dev branch).
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https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus
https://www.atlassian.com/software/bamboo  
 Continuous Integration & Quality Control
The SonarQube® platform is an open source quality management platform, 
dedicated to continuously analyzing and measuring the technical quality of source 
code, from project portfolio down to the method level, and tracking the 
introduction of new Bugs, Vulnerabilities, and Code Smells in the Leak Period.
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 Integrated Dev Environments (IDEs)
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 Integrated Dev Environments (IDEs)
● Convenience of integrated functionality:
○ editing
○ debugging
○ profiling
○ testing
○ repos/version control
● Most allow 3rd party plugins:
○ static analysis
○ memory checking
○ …
IDEs are just another tool.
118
 Generic IDE layout
119
“biggest advantage of IDE is debugging is easier, and 
code navigation is one click” (developer w/ a CTSC engagement)
output, debugging, etc.
projects/files;
git repos, etc.
outline 
view, etc.
editing, etc.
 IDEs: mostly GUI-driven
120
E.g. git perspective
 IDEs: most allow 3rd party plugins
121
e.g., FindBugs: 
static analysis for 
Java code
 IDEs: Warning/Error highlighting
122
error: undefined variable
warning: reserved symbol
 IDEs: both OSS and commercial
● Eclipse
● XCode
● Visual Studio
● IntelliJ
● NetBeans
● Nuclide - javascript
● ...
● https://www.jetbrains.{com,org}
● https://pypl.github.io/IDE.html 
123
many have support for 
multiple languages
 IDEs continue to evolve
“Jupyter web-based IDEs… teaching Data Science 
course with 500 students, largely freshmen, entirely 
through Jupyter running on Azure and campus-based 
servers.  I find these platforms significantly lower the 
bar of getting students up and running without 
installing software on heterogeneous & under-powered 
machines…”
- Carl Boettiger, UC Berkeley (comment in 
ctsc-discuss mailing list)
124
 Further Reading
● https://docs.travis-ci.com/ 
● https://pypl.github.io/IDE.html - popularity ranking 
of IDEs
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 Documentation
Document design & purpose, not mechanics.
a) Document interfaces and reasons, not implementations.
b) Refactor code in preference to explaining how it works.
c) Embed the documentation for a piece of software in that
    software.
127
Wilson, Greg, D. A. Aruliah, C. Titus Brown, Neil P. Chue Hong, 
Matt Davis, Richard T. Guy, Steven H. D. Haddock, et al. 2014. 
“Best Practices for Scientific Computing.” PLoS Biology 12 (1): 
e1001745.    dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001745
 Automatic documentation
Tools exist that generate useful docs for your code if 
you include that documentation in your code and 
follow the tools’ syntactic rules.
● motivation for embedding your documentation
● generates easy-to-navigate HTML/Latex/etc docs
128
 Javadoc: Generates HTML pages of API 
documentation from Java source files
/**
 * Returns an Image object that can then be painted on the screen. 
 * The url argument must specify an absolute {@link URL}. The name
 * argument is a specifier that is relative to the url argument. 
 * <p>
 * This method always returns immediately, whether or not the 
 * image exists. When this applet attempts to draw the image on
 * the screen, the data will be loaded. The graphics primitives 
 * that draw the image will incrementally paint on the screen. 
 *
 * @param  url  an absolute URL giving the base location of the image
 * @param  name the location of the image, relative to the url argument
 * @return      the image at the specified URL
 * @see         Image
 */
 public Image getImage(URL url, String name) {
        try {
            return getImage(new URL(url, name));
        } catch (MalformedURLException e) {
            return null;
        }
 }
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getImage
public Image getImage(URL url,
             String name)
Returns an Image object that can then be painted on the screen. The url 
argument must specify an absolute URL. The name argument is a specifier 
that is relative to the url argument.
This method always returns immediately, whether or not the image exists. 
When this applet attempts to draw the image on the screen, the data will be 
loaded. The graphics primitives that draw the image will incrementally paint 
on the screen.
Parameters:
url - an absolute URL giving the base location of the image.
name - the location of the image, relative to the url argument.
Returns:
the image at the specified URL.
See Also:
Image
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 Doxygen
“Doxygen is the de facto standard tool for generating 
documentation from annotated C++ sources, but it also supports 
other popular programming languages such as C, Objective-C, 
C#, PHP, Java, Python, IDL, Fortran, VHDL, Tcl, …”
C/C++: Docs annotation is inserted into headers (.h):
// .NAME classname - brief description
// .SECTION Description
// more detailed description
…
  // Description:
  // Assign a data object as input. Note that this method ...
  void SetInputData(int index, vtkDataObject* obj);
131
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 133
 Python  →  pydoc, Sphinx
134
yt Project. Last 
updated on Jul 25, 
2016. Created using 
Sphinx 1.3.4.
 Further Reading
● https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/api/
● http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html
● http://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/stable/index.html
● http://www.sphinx-doc.org/en/stable/ext/autodoc.
html
● https://docs.python.org/3/library/pydoc.html  
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 Best Practices: Summary
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 Best Practices
● Join/contribute to mailing lists related to secure software.
● Use a trustworthy software repository and hosting service.
● Use an issue tracking tool.
● Adopt a continuous integration (CI) process and tool.
● Incorporate static analysis into your CI process.
● Address at least the most severe issues from static analysis.
● Provide people-friendly documentation at multiple levels of 
the software lifecycle.
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 Best Practices
● Provide a digital signature/hash for your code.
● Validate the authenticity of code you download.
● Perform multiple levels of testing and, when possible, 
automate it.
● Use assertions in your code.
● Keep issue tracking, etc, private for vulnerability patches in 
progress.
● Put someone in charge of the vulnerability management 
process.
● Routinely test web apps using a trusted vulnerability 
scanner.
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 Further Reading
General:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsTC.html 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/ 
https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/
More specific:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-160/sp800_160_second-draft.pdf 
https://samate.nist.gov/Other_Test_Collections.html 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/index.html 
http://trustedci.org/trainingmaterials/ 
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 Thank You
Questions/Discussion
trustedci.org
@TrustedCI
We thank the National Science Foundation (grant 1547272) for supporting our work.
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representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the NSF. 
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